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Abstract
We develop a model of a small open economy with three types of nominal rigidities
(domestic goods prices, imported goods prices and wages) and eight di®erent structural
shocks. We estimate the model's structural parameters using a maximum likelihood
procedure and use it to compute welfare-maximizing Taylor rules for setting domestic
short-term interest rates. For these computations, we use a second-order approximation
around the model's deterministic steady state, which allows the Taylor rule coe±cients
to a®ect the means of consumption, leisure and real balances as well as their variances.
Welfare gains from moving to the optimal Taylor rule are substantial, but require a
very precise knowledge of the values of the model's structural parameters.
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A large literature analyzes optimal monetary policy in the context of the New Open-Economy
Macroeconomics (NOEM), a class of open-economy dynamic general-equilibrium models with
explicit microfoundations, nominal rigidities, and imperfect competition.1 Gal¶ ³ and Mona-
celli (1999) showed in a model with instantaneous pass-through of exchange rate changes
to domestic prices that optimal monetary policy is identical in open and closed economies
and involves stabilizing the overall price level, without regard to exchange rate °uctuations.
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) showed that with slow pass-through this is no longer the case:
it is optimal for the central bank to minimize a CPI-weighted average of markups charged
in the domestic market by domestic and foreign producers. Much of this literature uses
highly stylized models with analytical solutions. Recently, more fully developed models have
appeared. Kollmann (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2002) showed that optimal monetary
policy with sticky domestic-goods prices and imported-goods prices involves minimizing a
weighted average of domestic and import price in°ation.
In this paper, we analyze optimal monetary policy (within a class of simple monetary
rules) in a NOEM model of a small open economy with three types of nominal rigidities:
wages and both domestic and imported goods prices are set in advance by monopolistically
competitive agents. The model also incorporates eight di®erent types of structural shocks.
We estimate the model's structural parameters with Canadian and U.S. data using maximum
likelihood via the Kalman ¯lter. We then use the model to compute welfare-maximizing
Taylor rules for setting domestic short-term interest rates. For these computations, we use a
second-order approximation around the model's deterministic steady state, thereby allowing
the Taylor rule coe±cients to a®ect the means of consumption, leisure, and real balances as
well as their variances.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We estimate most of the parameters of
1The NOEM literature, spawned by the pioneering work of Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995), has been successful
in explaining phenomena such as high real exchange rate volatility and the strong impact of monetary policy
shocks on real exchange rates. See Sarno (2001), Lane (2001), and Bowman and Doyle (2003) for recent
surveys.
1the model precisely. The estimates are compatible with other small open economy models
in the NOEM literature, for example Bergin (2003) and Dib (2003). The optimal Taylor
rule involves responding more strongly to °uctuations in GDP and money growth than the
Bank of Canada has done historically. The gains from optimal monetary policy are quite
substantial. The gain in unconditional welfare amounts to 2.6% of the initial average level
of consumption compared to the stochastic steady state with the estimated values of the
Taylor rule coe±cients. Compared to the historical (estimated) values of the Taylor rule
coe±cients, optimized monetary policy responds more strongly to °uctuations in in°ation
and output, and less strongly to °uctuations in real money balances.
Our results di®er from those in the existing literature in three main respects. First, our
estimate of the welfare gain from optimal monetary policy is larger than in other recent pa-
pers that analyze optimal monetary policy in small open economies (for example Kollmann,
2002 and Smets and Wouters, 2002). Second, we investigate the robustness of the welfare
gains and ¯nd that the level of welfare is extremely sensitive to small changes in the values
of the Taylor rule coe±cients. As a function of the Taylor rule coe±cients, the slope of the
social welfare function is quite steep in the immediate neighborhood of the maximum, but
it becomes quite °at beyond this neighborhood: the welfare function is like a broad plain
with a small number of tall, narrow mountains. The location of the tallest peak in the plain
depends on the estimated values of the model's structural parameters. This means that
small errors in these estimates due to sampling error could lead monetary policy to miss the
mountain entirely. Third, we show that most of the welfare gain from optimized monetary
policy comes from its e®ects on the levels of variables rather than on the second moments of
the arguments of the period utility function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model. In
section 3, we discuss the estimation strategy used to attribute values to the model's struc-
tural parameters and the parameter estimates themselves. We discuss the calculation of
the optimal Taylor rule and present our results concerning the bene¯ts of optimal monetary
policy in section 4. Section 5 o®ers some conclusions.
22. The Model
The economy is small because it faces ¯xed prices on world markets for imported goods. Its
domestic output is an imperfect substitute for foreign goods, and it faces a downward-sloping
demand curve for its output on world markets. It also faces an upward-sloping supply curve
for funds on international capital markets.
Di®erent labor types are associated with particular households that act as monopolistic
competitors in the labor market. Di®erentiated intermediate goods are produced by mo-
nopolistically competitive domestic ¯rms using labor and a ¯nal composite good as inputs.
Di®erentiated intermediate goods are also imported by monopolistically competitive im-
porters. Domestic and imported intermediate goods are aggregated by competitive ¯rms to
form a composite domestic and a composite imported good. Some of the composite domestic
good is exported. The remainder is combined with the composite imported good to form the
¯nal good. As in McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001), imports enter the production process
rather than being consumed directly.2 The ¯nal good is used for consumption, government
consumption, and as an input into the production of domestic intermediate goods.
There are therefore three sources of monopoly distortion and nominal rigidities. House-
holds set wages in advance, and both importers and producers of domestic intermediate
goods set prices in advance. Following Calvo (1983), price and wage setters maintain con-
stant prices and wages unless they receive a signal to revise them, which arrives at the
beginning of each period with a constant probability. This assumption makes aggregation
simple, allows us easily to vary the average duration of the nominal rigidities, and allows us
to estimate the length of the nominal rigidities along with other structural parameters of the
model.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of di®erent households on the unit interval, indexed by j. The jth
household's preferences are given by:













where ¯ is the discount factor, E0 is the conditional expectations operator, Ct(j) is consump-
tion, Mt(j) denotes nominal money balances held at the end of the period, Pt is the price



















+ ´ log(1 ¡ ht(j)); (2)
where ° and ´ are positive parameters. Total time available to the household in the period is
normalized to one. This functional form of the period utility function leads to a conventional
money demand equation in which the short-term nominal interest rate is the opportunity
cost of holding money, ¡° is the interest elasticity of money demand, and consumption
is the scale variable. The bt term is a shock to money demand. It follows the ¯rst-order
autoregressive process given by:
log(bt)=( 1¡ ½b)log(b)+½b log(bt¡1)+"bt; (3)
with 0 <½ b < 1 and where the serially uncorrelated shock, "bt, is normally distributed with
















t¡1(j)+Tt + Dt; (4)
where Wt(j) is the nominal wage rate set by the household. Labor income is taxed at an
average marginal tax rate, ¿t. B¤
t and D
g
t are foreign-currency and domestic-currency bonds
purchased in t, and et is the nominal exchange rate. Domestic-currency bonds are used by the
government to ¯nance its de¯cit. Rt and R¤
t denote, respectively, the gross nominal domestic
and foreign interest rates between t and t +1 ;·t is a risk premium that re°ects departures
from uncovered interest parity. The household also receives nominal pro¯ts Dt = Dd
t + Dm
t
from domestic producers and importers of intermediate goods, and Tt is nominal lump-sum















t is the GDP de°ator or domestic output price index. The risk premium ensures
that the model has a unique steady state. If domestic and foreign interest rates are equal,
the time paths of domestic consumption and wealth follow random walks.3
The foreign nominal interest rate, R¤








with 0 <½ R¤ < 1 and where the serially uncorrelated shock, "R¤t, is normally distributed
with zero mean and standard deviation ¾R¤.
Household j chooses Ct(j), Mt(j), D
g
t(j), and B¤
t(j) (and Wt(j) if it is allowed to change
its wage) to maximize the expected discounted sum of its utility °ows subject to three
relationships: the budget constraint, equation (4), intermediate ¯rms' demand for their











where ¾ is the elasticity of substitution between di®erent labor skills. This implies the
















3For an early discussion of this problem, see Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1984). Our risk premium equation
is similar to the one used by Senhadji (1997). For alternative ways of ensuring that stationary paths exist
for consumption in small open-economy models, see Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003).














































































where ¤t(j) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the time t budget constraint. With











l=0(¯dw)l(1 ¡ ¿t+l)ht+l(j)¤t+l(j)=P d
t+l
(12)
This ¯rst-order condition gives a New Keynesian Phillips curve for wage in°ation (see section









where ~ Wt is the average wage of those workers who revise their wage at time t.
2.2 Goods production
2.2.1 Domestic intermediate goods
Firms have identical production functions given by:
Yt(i)=Xt(i)
Á (Atht(¢;i))
1¡Á ;Á 2 (0;1); (14)
6where ht(¢;i) is the quantity of the aggregate labor input employed by ¯rm i and Xt(i)i st h e
quantity of the ¯nal composite good used by ¯rm i.4 At is an aggregate technology shock
that follows the stochastic process given by:
log(At)=( 1¡ ½A)log(A)+½A log(At¡1)+"At; (15)
where "At is a normally distributed, serially uncorrelated shock with zero mean and standard
deviation ¾A. The ¯rm chooses Xt(i) and ht(¢;i) to maximize its stock market value. When
allowed to do so (with probability (1¡dp) each period), it also chooses the price of its output,
~ P d




















where ¤t is the marginal utility of wealth for a representative household, and
D
d
t+l(i) ´ ~ P
d
t (i)Yt+l(i) ¡ Wt+lht+l(¢;i) ¡ Pt+lXt+l(i);
where Pt is the price of the ¯nal output good, Zt. The maximization is subject to the ¯rm's











t is the exact price index of the composite domestic good. The elasticity of the







































4We include Xt(i) in the production of domestic intermediates for two reasons. First, without Xt(i),
the response of the real wage to demand shocks is too highly countercyclical. Second, as shown in similar
models by McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001), the presence of intermediates in the production function for
domestic goods a®ects the correlation between the nominal exchange rate and domestic in°ation.
7where »t(i) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the production function constraint. It
measures the ¯rm's real marginal cost. The ¯rst-order condition with respect to the ¯rm's
price relates the price to the expected future price of ¯nal output and to expected future
real marginal costs. It can be used to derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve relationship for
the rate of change of domestic output prices (see section (2.6)).
2.2.2 Imported intermediate goods
The economy imports a continuum of foreign intermediate goods on the unit interval. There
is monopolistic competition in the market for imported intermediates, which are imperfect
substitutes for each other in the production of the composite imported good, Y m
t , produced
by a representative competitive ¯rm. When allowed to do so (with probability (1¡dm) each
period), the importer of good i sets the price, ~ P m









































For convenience, we assume that the price in foreign currency of all imported intermediates
is P ¤
t , which is also equal to the foreign price level. The elasticity of the derived demand for





























This equation can be used to derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve relationship for the rate
of change of intermediate input prices (see section (2.6)).
82.2.3 Composite goods
The composite domestic good, Yt, is produced using a constant elasticity of substitution





















subject to the production function (24). The ¯rst-order conditions yield the derived demand
functions for the domestic intermediate goods given by (17). The exact price index for the













This price index corresponds to a producer price index (PPI) for the economy. The price















where ~ P d
t is the price index derived by aggregating over all ¯rms that change their price at
time t.
Composite domestic output, Yt, is divided between domestic use, Y d
t , and exports, Y x
t .














t is foreign output.6 The elasticity of demand for domestic output is ¡&, and ®x > 0
is a parameter determining the fraction of domestic exports in foreign spending. Domestic
5This condition can be derived from a foreign importing ¯rm that combines non-perfectly substitutable
imported goods.
6To ensure the existence of a balanced growth path for the economy, we assume that foreign output grows
at the same trend rate as domestic output.
9exports form an insigni¯cant fraction of foreign expenditures, and have a negligible weight
in the foreign price index.
The foreign variables P ¤
t and Y ¤



















where ¼¤ is steady-state foreign in°ation, and "¼¤t and "y¤t are zero-mean, serially uncorre-
lated shocks with standard errors ¾¼¤ and ¾y¤, respectively.
The composite imported good, Y m
t , is produced using a CES technology with a continuum
of imported-intermediate goods, Y m














It is produced by a representative competitive ¯rm. Its pro¯t maximization gives the derived









































where ~ P m
t is a price index derived by aggregating over all importers that change their price
in time t.
102.2.4 Final-goods production
The ¯nal good, Zt, is produced by a competitive ¯rm that uses Y d
t and Y m
t as inputs subject





















where ®d > 0, ®m > 0, º>0, and ®d + ®m = 1. The ¯nal good, Zt, is used for domestic
consumption, Ct, as inputs to produce domestic intermediate goods, Xt, and government















































Following Taylor (1993), Dib (2003) and Ireland (2003) among others, the central bank
manages the short-term nominal interest rate, Rt, in response to °uctuations in CPI in°ation
(¼t = Pt=Pt¡1), money growth (¹t = Mt=Mt¡1), and output (Yt). Its interest rate reaction
function is given by:
log(Rt=R)=%¼ log(¼t=¼)+%¹ log(¹t=¹)+%y log(Yt=Y)+"Rt; (40)
where ¼, ¹ and Y are the steady-state values of ¼t, ¹t and Yt, where R is the steady-state
value of the gross nominal interest rate, and where "Rt is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated
11monetary policy shock with standard deviation ¾R. The error term arises from the fact that
the central bank can controls short term interest rates only indirectly by setting the Bank
rate. The error term thus re°ects developments in money and ¯nancial markets that are not
explicitly captured by our model.
Money growth is included as an argument in the Taylor rule because of the inclusion of
money demand shocks in our model. They turn out to be important empirically and account
for a signi¯cant fraction of °uctuations in output and in°ation. If the central bank reacted
only to in°ation, money demand shocks could be exacerbated by the bank's behavior since
a positive money demand shock would lead to a decrease in in°ation, a reduction in short
term interest rates, and thereby to an endogenous increase in money demand. The inclusion
of CPI in°ation rather than PPI in°ation is motivated by the fact that the Bank of Canada
does in fact target CPI in°ation; also, reacting to CPI in°ation allows for an indirect channel
for reacting to exchange rate movements, since exchange rate °uctuations may be passed
through much more quickly to the CPI than to the PPI.7
2.4 The government
The government budget constraint is given by:
PtGt + Tt + D
g






The left side of (41) represents uses of government revenue: goods purchases, transfers, and
debt repayments. The right side includes tax revenues, money creation, and newly issued
debt. The government also faces a no-Ponzi constraint that implies that the present value




Because households have in¯nite horizons, there is Ricardian equivalence in the following
sense: given the tax rate on labor income, a change in the mix between lump-sum taxes and
borrowing does not a®ect the economy's equilibrium. We can simplify the budget constraint
7Ambler, Dib and Rebei (2003) present evidence that this is indeed the case for Canada.
12without loss of generality to:
PtGt + Tt = ¿tWtht + Mt ¡ Mt¡1: (42)
This implies that D
g
t is zero in each period. Government spending and the tax rate are
determined by:
log(Gt)=( 1¡ ½g)log(G)+½g log(Gt¡1)+"gt; (43)
and
log(¿t)=( 1¡ ½¿)log(¿)+½¿ log(¿t¡1)+"¿t: (44)
Given these stochastic processes and that the nominal money stock is determined by money
demand once the nominal interest rate is set, lump-sum taxes are determined residually to
balance the government's budget.
2.5 Equilibrium
There are two di®erent stochastic trends in the model. The ¯rst is in the foreign price level,
and arises from the speci¯cation of the stochastic process for P ¤
t in terms of rates of change in
equation (29). The second is in the price of domestic output and all other domestic nominal
variables, and arises from the fact that the monetary authority adjusts the domestic nominal
interest rate as a function of in°ation rather than the price level, according to equation (40).
Solving the model involves using stationary transformations of variables with unit roots.
We use the following transformations: pt ´ Pt=P d
t , mt ´ Mt=Pt, pm






t , ¼t ´ Pt=Pt¡1, ¼d
t ´ P d
t =P d
t¡1, wt ´ Wt=P d
t , ¼¤





t and st ´
etP ¤
t =P d
t . The complete system of equations in stationary variables that characterize the
model's equilibrium is given in Appendix B.
2.6 New Keynesian Phillips curves
The price- and wage-setting equations cannot be used directly to simulate the model since
they involve in¯nite summations. By linearizing these equations around the steady-state
values of the variables, and assuming zero in°ation in the steady state, we obtain three New
13Keynesian Phillips curves relationships that determine the rates of in°ation of locally pro-
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¸
; (47)
where hats over variables denote deviations from steady-state values. The New Keynesian
Phillips curve for domestic output in°ation is the same as in Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999). It
relates in°ation to expected future in°ation and to the real marginal cost of output. The
equation for import price in°ation is analogous, with real marginal cost captured by the real
exchange rate. The wage in°ation equation is also analogous. The term in square brackets
measures the marginal rate of substitution (the real marginal cost to workers of their work
e®ort) minus the real wage. The household's ¯rst-order condition for the nominal wage can
be interpreted as a markup over the average marginal cost of work e®ort over the life of the
wage contract.
3. Model Solution and Parameter Estimation
In order to estimate the model's parameters we use a linear approximation around its steady
state, but for welfare analysis we use a higher order approximation using the Dynare program
(Juillard, 2002).
The Blanchard and Kahn (1980) algorithm is used to solve the linearized model. It leads
to a state space representation with transition equations for the model's predetermined
endogenous state variables and observation equations relating those states to observable
macroeconomic aggregates. The model's forward-looking or jump state variables are elim-
inated from the state transition equations by the Blanchard and Kahn solution procedure.
14In the notation of Ireland (2004), we have:
st = Ast¡1 + B"t; (48)
The model is completed by the following set of observation equations relating the model's
state variables to observable endogenous variables:
ft = Cst: (49)
The column vector st¡1 contains the predetermined endogenous state variables of the model:
st¡1






t¡1 ;w t¡1 ;p
m
t¡1 ;m t¡1 ;b
¤
t¡1]
with all variables stationarized and measured in proportional deviations from their steady
state values. With eight structural shocks in the model, we include eight variables in the ft
vector in order to avoid the stochastic singularity problem discussed by Ingram, Kocherlakota
and Savin (1994). This problem stems from the fact that, with more than eight observation
equations, there would be exact or deterministic relationships among certain combinations
of the model's endogenous variables. If these relationships did not hold exactly in the data,
estimation by maximum likelihood would break down. We include the ¯ve state variables
that are directly observable as well as consumption, CPI in°ation, and the domestic interest
rate:
ft







once again with all variables measured in proportional deviations from their steady state
values.
The Kalman ¯lter is used to write down the model's log-likelihood function given its
state space representation.8 The same estimation method is used by Dib (2003) and Ireland
(2003). The parameters are then estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function over
the sample period from 1981:1 to 2002:4 sample period.
8See Hamilton (1994, ch.13) or Ireland (2004) for detailed descriptions.
153.1 Parameter estimates
Table 1 summarizes our parameter estimates. Not counting constants in the stochastic
processes for the model's forcing variables, the model has 36 structural parameters. Of
these, we were unable to estimate six because they were poorly identi¯ed. These parameters
were assigned calibrated values, as outlined in the following paragraph.
The subjective discount rate, ¯, is given a standard value, which implies an annual real
interest rate of 4 per cent in the steady state. The weight on leisure in the utility function,
´, is calibrated so that the representative household spends about one third of its total
time working in the steady state. The ®x parameter is a normalization that ensures that
the current account is balanced in the long run. The demand elasticities, ¾, µ, and #,
in°uence the stochastic properties of the model in a very indirect way. After linearization,
they no longer appear in the three New Keynesian Phillips curve equations. By in°uencing
the size of the markups over marginal cost, they do in°uence the steady-state levels of the
domestic production of intermediate goods, imported intermediate goods, and employment.
Because certain coe±cients in the linearized model depend on the steady-state levels of
endogenous variables, the moments predicted by the model are related to these parameters.
Unfortunately, the in°uence is so weak that it is impossible to estimate them precisely. The
µ and # parameters give the elasticity of substitution across di®erent types of intermediate
goods in the production of the composite domestic good and the composite imported good.
Setting µ = # = 8 gives a steady-state markup of 14 per cent, which agrees well with estimates
in the empirical literature of between 10 per cent and 20 per cent (see, for example, Basu
1995). The ¾ parameter gives the elasticity of substitution across di®erent labor types in
the production of individual domestic intermediate goods. The value of six corresponds to
estimates from microdata in Gri±n (1992).9
Of the estimated parameters in Table 1, most have small standard errors and are highly
signi¯cant. In particular, the nominal rigidity parameters are highly signi¯cant. They are
9It also agrees with the value estimated in Ambler, Guay, and Phaneuf (2003) using aggregate time series
data. They succeeded in estimating the value of the equivalent parameter in their model by calibrating the
equivalent of the dw parameter.
16of plausible magnitude and within the range of values in previous empirical studies and in
calibrated general-equilibrium models. The estimate of dp implies that the prices of domestic
intermediate goods remain ¯xed for, on average, slightly more than three quarters. The other
prices are revised less often on average, but still well within the range of plausibility. Import
prices remain ¯xed for, slightly more than four quarters on average. Nominal wages remain
¯xed for slightly more than six quarters on average.
The estimated values of the Taylor rule imply, since the sum of %¼ and %¹ is greater than
unity, that the long-run level of the in°ation rate is determinate and the model is saddlepoint
stable, with a unique dynamic solution in response to shocks. The value of %y suggests that
the Bank of Canada intervened only weakly if at all during the sample period to °uctuations
in real output.10
The stochastic processes for the model's forcing variables highly persistent, with AR(1)
parameters above 0.59. The standard deviations of the innovations to the processes vary
widely in magnitude, ranging from 0.0021 in the case of foreign in°ation shocks to 0.0771
in the case of money demand shocks. The volatility of foreign shocks is smaller than that
of domestic shocks, which suggests the relative importance of domestic shocks for business
cycle °uctuations in the Canadian economy.
4. Optimal Monetary Policy
Given the estimated and calibrated values of the model's structural parameters, we optimized
over the three coe±cients of the Taylor rule to ¯nd the values that maximize unconditional
welfare. The maximization problem can be written as follows:
max
%¼;%¹;%y
E fu(Ct;m t;h t)g: (50)
10We also allowed monetary policy to respond to real exchange rate °uctuations in some of our estimations.
The coe±cient was very small in magnitude and insigni¯cant. We did not allow for regime shifts when
estimating the Taylor rule coe±cients.
17The solution amounts to maximizing welfare in the steady state.11 It ignores any costs
involved in the transition between the initial stochastic steady state with the estimated
values of the Taylor rule coe±cients and the new stochastic steady state with optimized
Taylor rule coe±cients. We address this issue in Section (4.2).
It is now clear that for the purposes of welfare evaluation in dynamic, stochastic general
equilibrium models, ¯rst-order approximations of the model's equilibrium conditions are
not adequate. Kim and Kim (2003) provide a simple example of a model in which welfare
appears higher under autarky than under complete markets because of the inaccuracy of the
linearization method.12
To compute the welfare-maximizing Taylor rules, we used the Dynare program to calcu-
late the theoretical ¯rst and second moments of the model's endogenous variables, including
period utility.13 Our main results are presented in Table 2. The second column of the table
reproduces the historical (estimated) values of the Taylor rule coe±cients from Table 1 in
order to facilitate comparison with their optimized values. The table shows the optimized
Taylor rule coe±cients for three di®erent cases with the estimated degree of nominal wage
and price rigidities. For the base case scenario we optimized over all three of the coe±cients.
The results are shown in the third column of the table. We considered two di®erent scenarios
with constraints imposed on one of the three coe±cients. Results for a scenario in which
%y = 0 are shown in column four. Results for the case where %¹ = 0 are shown in the ¯fth
column. This case corresponds to the optimal Taylor rule calculated by Kollmann (2002) in
a small open economy model calibrated for Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. The
last column of Table 2 shows optimal Taylor rule coe±cients for a case where nominal wage
and price rigidities are completely removed from the model.
For each scenario, we measure the welfare gain from optimal monetary policy by means of
the compensating variation. This measures the percentage change in consumption given the
11It has become standard practice in the literature to abstract from welfare gains and losses due to changes
in real money balances. Because we ¯nd empirically that money demand shocks explain a substantial fraction
of output °uctuations, we decided not to shut down the e®ects of money demand shocks on the model.
12See Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2003) for a more general discussion.
13We use the default option of a pure perturbation method as in Schmitt-Groh¶ e (2002) for calculating the
moments.
18equilibrium with the historically estimated values of the Taylor rule coe±cients that would
give households the same unconditional expected utility as in the indicated scenario. The
compensating variation is de¯ned as follows:







where variables without asterisks refer to variables under the historical (estimated) values of
the Taylor rule coe±cients, and variables with asterisks refer to variables under the optimized
Taylor rule coe±cients.
The results are striking. The compensating variation for the base case is quite large.
Consumption in each period would have to increase by 2.69% in the model with the his-
torical values of the Taylor rule coe±cients in order for agents to be as well o® as with the
optimal coe±cients. The gains in the constrained cases are of course smaller. The compen-
sating variation when %¹ = 0 is equal to equal 1.07% of consumption. This is close to the
welfare gain calculated by Kollmann (2002). He calculates his welfare gains compared to the
deterministic steady state in which the variance of each shock is set equal to zero, rather
than the stochastic steady state with historical values of the Taylor rule coe±cients as we do.
His compensating variation is 0.39%. Note from Table 3 that in our model the deterministic
steady state gives a welfare improvement over the stochastic steady state with the historical
Taylor rule coe±cients. The size of the compensating variation is 0.835%. The di®erence
between this welfare gain and the welfare gain under optimized Taylor rule coe±cients with
%¹ = 0 is 0.233%, very close to Kollmann's ¯gure.
The results indicate that, surprisingly, an optimized Taylor rule can lead to a higher level
of welfare than in presence of nominal wage and price rigidities than with °exible wages and
prices. The last column of Table 2 shows that welfare is higher under °exible prices and
wages (with optimized Taylor rule coe±cients) than in the stochastic steady state with the
historical values of the Taylor rule coe±cients and with the estimated values of the price
and wage rigidity parameters. However, the compensating variation is equal to 0.84% of the
average level of consumption in the historical case, signi¯cantly lower than the base case and
slightly lower than our two constrained cases. This result is an example of the generalized
19theory of the second best. Because of the presence of other distortions such as monopoly
power by domestic ¯rms and importers, and the fact that the economy's terms of trade are
endogenous, there is no guarantee that the optimized Taylor rule without the distortions due
to nominal rigidities will do better that the optimized Taylor rule in the presence of those
distortions.
Compared to the historical values of the Taylor rule coe±cients, monetary policy in the
base case responds more strongly to °uctuations in in°ation and output, and less strongly to
°uctuations in the growth of real balances. Despite these di®erences, the coe±cients of the
optimized Taylor rule are quite close to the corresponding historical values.14 This suggests
that the measured welfare gains may be quite sensitive to small variations in the Taylor rule
coe±cients. This is con¯rmed by a detailed analysis of the shape of the welfare function in
the space of the Taylor rule coe±cients.
Figure 1 shows the shape of the welfare function in the %¼ / %y plane, holding constant the
value of %¹ at its optimal level. The ¯gure shows that the welfare function looks like a broad,
°at plain with an area of rougher terrain in the southwest corner. The global maximum
occurs at the top of a narrowly-based peak. There are several other smaller peaks (one of
which is almost as tall as the global maximum) in the neighborhood of the global maximum
that also have very narrow bases (and one other peak that is nearly as tall). We located the
global maximum by performing a grid search with a fairly narrow grid for the values of the
Taylor rule coe±cients. When instead we used the MATLAB functions _fmincon _fminunc,
and _fminsearch, the algorithms failed completely to locate the mountain for any starting
values not already on its slope. The maximization algorithms often got stuck on smaller
peaks or in the plain itself. This indicates that the substantial improvement in welfare from
optimizing the Taylor rule coe±cients is not very robust. The location of the mountain
in the plain depends in a complicated way on the underlying structural parameters of the
model. Our estimates of those parameters are of course subject to sampling error, even if
our structural small open economy model has no speci¯cation errors. For this reason, the
14This is no longer true for the constrained cases. For both of these scenarios monetary policy responds
much more strongly to variations in in°ation than with the estimated values of the Taylor rule coe±cients.
20Taylor rule coe±cients that are optimal for our parameter estimates may yield a value for
the welfare function that is suboptimal for the model's true parameter values. Using these
Taylor rule coe±cients may lead monetary policy to miss the slope of the mountain entirely.
On the other hand, there are no deep canyons in the plain. Using suboptimal values for
the Taylor rule coe±cients should at least not lead to disastrously poor results in terms of
welfare.
4.1 Level e®ects versus stabilization e®ects
Because the model is solved using a second-order approximation of its equilibrium conditions
around the deterministic steady-state levels of its variables, both the variances of shocks and
the monetary policy rule (which in°uences how the shocks are transmitted to the economy)
can a®ect the means of the endogenous variables of the economy.
Table 3 shows the average levels of various endogenous variables, and the standard devi-
ations of the same variables, in the deterministic steady state, the initial stochastic steady
state (with the estimated values of the Taylor rule coe±cients), in the steady state with the
optimal Taylor rule, and in a °exible price equilibrium with dw, dp and dm set equal to zero
and with the Taylor rule coe±cients reoptimized given these new values.
It is also possible to summarize to what extent the gains in welfare are coming from the
e®ects of the change in policy on the levels of consumption, leisure and real balances versus
changes in the volatility of these variables. We can approximate the di®erence between
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21This allows us to decompose the gains in welfare from optimal monetary policy into a level
e®ect and a stabilization e®ect. We de¯ne the level e®ect as:
E fu(Ct(1 + ³L);m t;h t)g = Eu(zt)+uzE (^ z
¤
t ¡ ^ zt): (52)
We de¯ne the stabilization e®ect as follows:
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¤
t ¡ ^ zt): (53)
The results are shown in the last two rows of Table 3. The overall e®ect in all cases is such
that approximately:
(1 + ³) ¼ (1 + ³L)(1 + ³S): (54)
The most important result is that the welfare gain from optimizing the Taylor rule coe±cients
comes almost entirely from the e®ect on the average levels of consumption, hours worked and
real balances. The level e®ect comes from an increase in the average level of consumption of
over ¯ve percent, which more than compensates for a four percent increase in hours worked
and a seven percent decrease in real balances.
Our results show that there is no additional gain from eliminating wage and price rigidity
from the model once the Taylor rule coe±cients are optimized. Indeed, the level of steady
state welfare attainable under °exible prices and wages is lower than in our base case scenario.
The simple monetary rules that we analyze here go most of the way to completely eliminating
the welfare costs due to the presence of nominal rigidities. However, because of the presence
of additional distortions in the model (such as the economy's monopoly power over the types
of goods that it sells on world markets), we do not know how close the optimized Taylor rule
can come to the fully optimal monetary policy.
4.2 Transition costs
[SECTION TO BE COMPLETED LATER]
By maximizing unconditional welfare, we are implicitly comparing two di®erent stochastic
steady states. The welfare comparison ignores the possibility of losses in welfare on the
22transition path from one steady state to another. The possibility is particularly acute for
open economies. Welfare in the new steady state with optimal policy may be higher because
a higher level of net foreign assets allows individuals to enjoy a higher level of consumption.
However, acquiring the additional foreign assets implies a lower level of consumption in
the short run. The short term loss may even swamp the long term gain if individuals are
su±ciently impatient.
In order to guard against this possibility, we simulated the transition from the stochastic
steady state with the estimated values of the Taylor rule coe±cients to the steady state
with the optimal Taylor rule. We subjected the model to stochastic simulations under the
estimated values of the Taylor rule coe±cients and then simulated the implementation of the
optimal Taylor rule, taking the mean values of the economy's predetermined state variables
under the old rule as initial conditions for the simulations. The results are presented in
Figure 1. The graph indicates that there is a modest loss in utility when the optimal policy
is implemented. The reduction in utility lasts for XXX periods, and then the transition to
the new steady state with a higher level of period utility is quite rapid.
These results are for the optimized Taylor rule in our base case scenario. For both con-
strained Taylor rules the results are quite di®erent. In these cases, average money balances
increase substantially. Most of the welfare gain comes about from this increased average
level of real balances. In fact, the decomposition of the welfare gain into a levels e®ect and
a stabilization e®ect shows that the component of the compensating variation coming from
stabilization is strongly negative. In these cases, since the long run bene¯ts come mainly
from a large buildup of real balances, the transition costs are actually quite high. The mod-
est costs of transition in our base case can be partly explained by the fact that agents do
not have to sacri¯ce too much current consumption and leisure in order to build up assets
that make them better o® in the steady state.
It is possible that an optimization of the Taylor rule coe±cients based on maximizing
conditional welfare. However, optimizing conditional welfare is technically much more
challenging, and the modest initial dip in welfare combined with the rapid transition to the
new steady state level of welfare mean that the marginal gains are unlikely to be large.
235. Conclusions
This paper has shown that it is feasible to construct a fully developed NOEM model of a
small open economy such as Canada, to estimate almost all of its parameters using maximum
likelihood techniques, and to use the model to analyze optimal monetary policy by calculating
the values of the Taylor rule coe±cients that maximize unconditional welfare. The time is
perhaps not far o® when central banks themselves will integrate the use of such models into
the formulation of their monetary policy.
Our results show that it is possible to improve welfare substantially by getting the co-
e±cients of a modi¯ed Taylor rule right. The welfare increase is equivalent to a permanent
2.6% increase in the level of consumption between the stochastic steady states with the es-
timated values of the Taylor rule coe±cients and the optimal values. The transition costs of
moving to the optimal stochastic steady state are relatively modest. However, the welfare
function is very sensitive to the values of the Taylor rule coe±cients in the neighborhood of
the optimum, and the location of the optimum is sensitive to the estimated values of the
structural parameters of the model.
Much work remains to be done. We need to incorporate capital into the model so that
it can better reproduce the persistence of some of the main macroeconomic aggregates. We
need to do more work on the di®erence between policies that maximize conditional versus
unconditional welfare. We need to work on deriving the truly optimal feedback rule and to
evaluate the welfare loss from using a Taylor rule that is necessarily an approximation to
the fully optimal rule. We need to analyze the problem of time consistency. Finally, we need
to examine whether the result that welfare gains are extremely sensitive to the coe±cients of
the optimal policy rule and to the structural parameters of the model is robust to di®erent
types of models.
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Appendix A: Data and Data Sources
Our data set is available on request. The data are from Canada and the United States and
are quarterly from 1981Q3 to 2002Q4. The Canadian data are from Bank of Canada Banking
and Financial Statistics, a monthly publication by the Bank of Canada. Series numbers are
indicated in brackets and correspond to Cansim databank numbers.
² Consumption, Ct, is measured by real personal spending on non-durable goods and
services in 1997 dollars (non-durables [v1992047] + services [v1992119]).
² The CPI in°ation rate, ¼t, is measured by changes in the consumer price index, Pt
[v18702611].
² The short-term nominal interest rate, Rt, is measured by the yield on Canadian three-
month treasury bills [v122531].
² Government spending, Gt, is measured by government expenditures on goods and ser-
vices (total domestic demand [v1992068] ¡ total personal expenditures [v1992115] ¡
construction [v1992053 + v1992055] ¡ machinery and equipment investment [v1992056]).
27² The labor tax rate, ¿t, is measured by the e®ective labor tax rate (calculated following
the methodology of Jones 2002; and Mendoza, Razin, and Tezar 1994).
² The series in per-capita terms are obtained by dividing each series by the Canadian
civilian population aged 15 and over (civilian labor force [v2062810] = labor force
participation [v2062816]).
The U.S. data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, with the series numbers
in brackets. The world series are approximated by some of the U.S. series.
² World output, Y ¤
t , is real U.S. GDP per capita in 1996 dollars [GDPC96] divided by
the U.S. civilian non-institutional population [CNP16OV].
² The world nominal interest rate, R¤
t, is measured by the rate on U.S. three-month
Treasury Bills [TB3MS].
² The world in°ation rate, ¼¤
t, is measured by changes in the U.S. GDP implicit price
de°ator, P ¤
t [GDPDEF].
Appendix B: Equilibrium Conditions
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log(At)=( 1¡ ½A)log(A)+½A log(At¡1)+"At; (B.24)
log(bt)=( 1¡ ½b)log(b)+½b log(bt¡1)+"bt; (B.25)
log(Gt)=( 1¡ ½g)log(G)+½g log(Gt¡1)+"gt; (B.26)



















where equation (B.20) gives the trade balance of the economy.
31Table 1: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Value Standard deviation t-stat p-value
Stochastic processes
½a 0.5900 0.1316 4.4229 0.0000
½b 0.7920 0.0257 30.8171 0.0000
½g 0.8152 0.0642 12.6978 0.0000
½¿ 0.9502 0.0378 25.1376 0.0000
½r¤ 0.8619 0.0198 43.5303 0.0000
½y¤ 0.9832 0.0078 126.051 0.0000
½¼¤ 0.7794 0.1158 6.7306 0.0000
¾a 0.0262 0.0044 5.9545 0.0000
¾b 0.0771 0.0054 14.2778 0.0000
¾g 0.0071 0.0006 11.8333 0.0000
¾¿ 0.0297 0.0022 13.5000 0.0000
¾r¤ 0.0021 0.0002 10.5000 0.0000
¾y¤ 0.0065 0.0005 13.0000 0.0000
¾¼¤ 0.0022 0.0002 11.0000 0.0000
¾r 0.0141 0.0011 12.8182 0.0000
b 0.2961 0.0580 5.1052 0.0000
Nominal rigidity
dw 0.8764 0.0381 23.0026 0.0000
dp 0.5786 0.2197 2.6336 0.0050
dm 0.7708 0.0796 9.6834 0.0000
Interest rate rule
%¼ 0.7959 0.1743 4.5663 0.0000
%¹ 0.5484 0.1965 2.7908 0.0065
%y 0.0095 0.0860 0.1105 0.9123
Foreign supply/demand
®x 0.074 calibrated
' -0.0199 0.0353 0.5637 0.5745
& 0.7027 0.1321 5.3195 0.0000
Production
º y 0.7027 0.1321 5.3195 0.0000
®d 0.7224 0.2297 3.1450 0.0023





° 0.2282 0.0718 3.1783 0.0021
¯ 0.99 calibrated
´ 1.35 calibrated
y | º was constrained to equal &Table 2: Optimized Taylor Rule Coe±cients
Historical Base Case Constrained Cases Flex-Price
%y =0 %¹ =0
%¼ 0.7959 0.9000 3.8000 3.8300 1.2400
%¹ 0.5484 0.3300 0.0000 | 0.0000
%y 0.0095 0.2100 | 0.0700 0.2400
CV¤ | 2.6906 1.0358 1.0682 0.8381
¤: compensating variation in percent
33Table 3: Average Values and Standard Deviations
Deterministic Initial Stochastic Optimal Stochastic Constrained Constrained Flexible Price
Steady State Steady State Steady State Steady State 1y Steady State 2z Equilibrium
Averages
Consumption 0.7308 0.7220 0.7612 0.7335 0.7337 0.7395
Hours Worked 0.3182 0.3160 0.3292 0.3193 0.3192 0.3272
Real Balances 0.5937 0.5970 0.5554 0.9936 0.9498 1.6801
Period Utility -0.8336 -0.8419 -0.8154 -0.8317 -0.8313 -0.8336
Standard Deviations
Consumption 0.0000 0.0221 0.0163 0.0368 0.0348 0.0353
Hours Worked 0.0000 0.0110 0.0087 0.0103 0.0009 0.0194
Real Balances 0.0000 0.0385 0.0734 0.3125 0.2949 0.4334
Period Utility 0.0000 0.0280 0.0269 0.0469 0.0452 0.0421
Compensating Variations (%)
CV¤ 0.8350 0.0000 2.6906 1.0358 1.0682 0.8381
Level E®ect 0.7488 0.0000 2.6763 1.5775 1.5383 1.9357
Stabilizaton E®ect 0.0869 0.0000 0.0164 -0.5357 -0.4649 -1.0826
y: optimum with ½y =0
z: optimum with ½¹ =0
¤: compensating variation in percent
3
4Figure 1: Objective Function with %¹ =0 :33
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